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Abstract
The problem of piracy is that the world press nowadays often focuses on waters off the coast of 
Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. That is understandable given the recent phenomenal upsurge of piratical 
activities in that poverty stricken part of the world. Poverty, alongwith degradation of the rule of law, 
is often a catalyst for criminal acts, and if that situation occurred in maritime neighborhood, it usually 
takes form of piracy and armed robbery against ships. Southeast Asia is one of those places. The 
primary purpose of this essay is to examine the deficiencies of regional efforts to combat piracy and 
armed robbery against ships in Southeast Asia. To provide readers with an understanding of the legal 
difficulties involved with piracy and armed robbery in Southeast Asia
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I. INTRODUCTION
...Soon after the pirates had boarded the tanker ... Bedlam erupted 
on the ship’s decks as the pirates tried to round up the frightened crew... 
[The pirates] were on the bridge. They switched on the public address 
system and started beating the captain until his shouts for the crew to 
surrender blared over the ship’s loudspeakers. ‘Please, they are killing 
me,’ he cried. Sixteen crewmen eventually gave up. Each was asked his 
name, then bound and blindfolded.1
* The author obtained his LL.B. from the University of Indonesia in 2006 with Trans-
national Law as a major. The interest and research for the topic of this treatise was 
born from coaching international moot court competitions, namely the International 
Humanitarian Law Moot Court Competition held by the Red Cross (2008, 2009 and 
2010) and the Asia Cup Moot Court Competition held by the Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (2010). The author is a former IHL officer for the Indonesian Red 
Cross Society and currently working as a corporate lawyer in Jakarta, he is also a 
researcher at the Institute for Indonesian Law and Governance Development.
1 Peter Gwin, ‘Dark Passage: The Strait of Malacca. Pirates haunt it. Sailors fear it, 
Global trade depends on it’, National Geographic, October 2007, Feature Article, p. 
4. available at <http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/>
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Put aside imaginations of “Avast, me hearties!” screamed by swash-
bucklers with cutlasses between their teeth as they go swinging through 
the riggings. Modern day “gentlemen of fortune” are less associated 
with adventurism and romanticism as was the case with images of 
Henry Morgan and Calico Jack. Their effects on sea-borne trade, how-
ever, like their counterparts in yestercenturies, modern day pirates are 
equally destructive.
On the problem of piracy, the world press nowadays often focuses 
on waters off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. That is under-
standable given the recent phenomenal upsurge of piratical activities in 
that poverty stricken part of the world. Poverty, alongwith degradation 
of the rule of law, is often a catalyst for criminal acts, and if that situa-
tion occurred in maritime neighborhood, it usually takes form of piracy 
and armed robbery against ships. Southeast Asia is one of those places. 
Being one of the most densely populated areas in the world and witness 
to numerous local conflicts, Southeast Asia had become a largely poor 
and “lawless” region. As a result, not a small number of its denizens 
resorted to criminal acts, including ordinary fishermen with few means 
to make ends meet.
The primary purpose of this essay is to examine the deficiencies of 
regional efforts to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships in 
Southeast Asia. To provide readers with an understanding of the legal 
difficulties involved with piracy and armed robbery in Southeast Asia, 
Part II will briefly elaborate the inadequacy of existing international le-
gal framework to effectively deal with the problem. Part III will discuss 
the positive and negative points of cooperation between countries in the 
region in fighting piracy and armed robbery against ships; part III will 
also attempt suggest possible improvements for regional cooperation.
II. PIRACY IN SEA, A PROBLEM SINCE THE ANTIQUITY
That our sails may meet favorable winds
That the sea lanes be peaceful and secure
That gold, pearls, wealth and valuables fill our ships full with glory
With pious hearts do we offer up this excellent wine.2
2  Chinese sailors’ seagoing incantation proffered to the heavens. See Joseph Cum-
Yo ho ho and a bucket of cash : The need to enchance regional effort to combat piracy ...
62Volume 12 Number 1 October 2014
Labeling piracy in Southeast Asia as a recent trend is false. Chi-
nese history recorded this phenomenon as far back as the 15th century. 
Shortly after ascended the throne as the third emperor of the Ming Dy-
nasty, Emperor Yongle commissioned the building of a massive fleet 
composed of ships that dwarfed any European vessels of the time, ap-
pointed at the helm of this ancient carrier battle group was Admiral 
Zheng He. Yongle’s instruction to the Muslim Admiral was to go be-
yond the horizon to establish order, to make manifest the wealth and 
power of the Middle Kingdom, to hand out gifts for foreign Kings and 
accept tribute – alongwith submission – in return. Those that refused 
were pacified by force, as was the case with pirates along the Strait of 
Malacca.3 Returning from his first voyage in 1407, Zheng He engaged 
and defeated the 5000-strong Palembang-based pirate band under the 
command of Chen Zuyi.4
A. Piracy Prone Waters
Recently, Abdul Rahim Hussein, a senior official of the Malaysian 
National Security Council, stated that incidents of piracy in the Strait of 
Malacca have dropped to zero as of 2009, thanks to joint anti-piracy ef-
forts of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.5 The Strait’s bleak fame as 
a pirate haven started from the 90s on to the early years of 21st century. 
According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), there are 70 
incidents of piracy in 1998.6 After the financial crisis swept trough the 
region, sea-borne attacks climb trough 148 in 1999 and 220 in 2000.7 If 
mins, History’s great untold stories: obscure events of lasting importance, (Sidney: 
Murdoch books, 2006), p. 58. 
3  Id., pp. 58, 60, 64-65.
4  Gene M. Chenoweth, ‘Melaka, “Piracy” and the Modern World System’, Journal of 
Law and Religion, 13 (1996-1998), 107-125 (117-118). Chen Zuyi and his lieutenants 
were captured, brought to the Forbidden City and beheaded as an example of.
5  ‘Piracy in the Malacca Strait is Zero’, Tempo Interaktif, 19 May 2009, (in Indo-
nesian). available at http://www.tempointeraktif.com/; Abd Rahim Bin Hussin, ‘The 
Management of Straits of Malacca: Burden Sharing as the Basis for Cooperation’, pre-
sentation at the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition (LIMA) 
International Maritime Conference, 2005.
6  ICC – IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, Annual Report, 1 January – 
31 December 1998, (January 1999). Available by request to the IMB.
7  ICC – IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, Annual Report, 1999 and 
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we compare that with 2008 where ‘only’ two incidents occurred, previ-
ous years’ numbers seems astronomical.8
While this might be gleeful news to some, it must not be taken for 
granted. The Strait of Malacca always becomes one of the focuses in 
anti-piracy efforts because of its importance as an artery of world’s 
economy. There are more than 50,000 vessels passing trough the nar-
row strait annually.9 It carries substantial amount of energy traffic, near-
ly 50 percent of the world’s crude oil and 66 percent of its natural gas 
is transported through this narrow strait,10 and most of it is for Japan 
and China’s ever burgeoning thirst for energy. Statistics as such easily 
makes it one of the planet’s busiest – and most important – waterways.
Viewed on maps, the Strait of Malacca – and subsequent Strait of 
Singapore – seems able to accommodate all kinds of ships ever envi-
sioned, unfortunately that assumption is false. In average, the Strait of 
Malacca has a depth of only 25 meters, hence unable to accommodate 
Leviathans such as Ultra Large Crude Carriers (ULCC) and Capsize-
class bulk carriers.11 Such vessels can only pass trough another important 
Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC), which is Lombok – Makassar 
line. From 2000 to 2008, there were several low level piracy attempts 
2000, respectively. The trend continued until 2005, as a result, the Straits of Malacca 
and Singapore were listed as areas of ”perceived enhanced risk” by the Lloyd’s Joint 
War Committee, alongwith an increase in insurance costs for commercial shipping.
8  ICC – IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, Annual Report, 1 January – 
31 December 2008, (January 2009). 
9  Strait of Malacca is one of the “chokepoints” of world oil transit. Chokepoints are 
narrow channels along widely used global sea routes. They are a critical part of global 
energy security due to the high volume of oil traded through their narrow straits. Other 
chokepoints include the Suez Canal, Strait of Hormuz, and the Bab el-Mandab. See 
Energy Information Administration Homepage [online], World Oil Transit Choke-
points, Available at <http://www.eia.doe.gov/>; For a more complete overview of the 
strategic importance of the Strait of Malacca, see Donald B. Freeman, The Straits 
of Malacca: gateway or gauntlet?, (Quebec: McGill-Quenn University Press, 2003).
10  Chennai 2004, ‘Pirates on the Prowl: High Seas, Low Security’, Businessline, May 
31, 2004, cited in: Kevin X. Li and Jin Cheng, ‘Maritime Law and Policy for Energy 
Security in Asia: A Chinese Perspective’, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 
37 (2006), 567-587 (569).
11  With a draft (distance from waterline to keel) of over 25 meters, such ships are 
called post-Malaccamax. The term Malaccamax refers to the largest ships that can 
pass trough the Strait of Malacca.
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in these waters, even on large crude tankers.12 Despite the relatively low 
intensity of these attacks, it is only a matter of time before it grows into 
something more sinister like ship seizure and ransoming, if not dealt 
with appropriately and promptly.
Aside from Strait of Malacca and other SLOCs, Southeast Asia’s 
total SAY km2 waters are also home to numerous pirate prone areas and 
ports. Attacks ranging from simple maritime mugging to seajacking in-
volving brutal killings of the crew are reported to take place throughout 
the region. In recent years, perhaps as a result of vigilant efforts in Strait 
of Malacca, focus of pirate attacks has shifted to littoral South China 
Sea (off the coast of Peninsular Malaysia), Vietnam (around Vung Tau), 
and ports on the eastern coast of Kalimantan to name a few.13
III.REGULATIONS AGAINST PIRACY AND OTHER CRIMINAL 
ACTS AT SEA
Since the crime of piracy has been with us since humans first sailed 
the seven seas, so does the prohibitions to it.14 One of the first written 
laws specifically enacted to address the problem of piracy was the Pira-
cy Act 1698 passed by the English Parliament.15 The 1698 Act provides 
that all natural borne subjects and denizens (regardless of nationality) 
of the English Kingdom who commit piracy or robbery or any act of 
hostility against other His Majesties subjects at sea, shall be deemed to 
be pirates felons and robbers, and for those convicted of piracy, a pen-
alty of death and confiscation of lands and property awaits, “as pirates 
12  Analysis of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, Annual Reports, 2005 – 
2008.
13  Id.
14  Although Justinian’s Digest did not offer a definition of piracy and did not spe-
cifically criminalize piratical acts; it may cover acts committed by pirates by way of 
extension. It maintained that the exercitor (person who has the management of the 
ship), is liable for almost any loss, theft or damages occurred within the ship under his 
custody, he is also liable for acts committed by his crew. Charles Henry Monro (trs), 
The Digest of Justinian, I vols, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1904), pp. 
294-299.; See also Phillip A. Buhler, New Struggle With An Old Menace: Towards A 
Revised Definition Of Maritime Piracy, Currents: International Trade Law Journal, 
8 (Winter 1999), 61-70, FN 23.
15  An Act for the more effectuall Suppressions of Piracy 1698 (11 William 3 c 11).
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ought to have and suffer”.
The 1698 Piracy Act was soon followed by enactments of similar 
legislations by European Imperials such as France. In the olden days, 
as it is now, inter-state commerce (mainly spice from the colonies) and 
human migration was conducted primarily by sea. Any acts of piracy 
threatened those activities and hence, infringe the interests of all na-
tions involved in transnational commerce. This is the reason why the 
crime of piracy is international in nature and pirates are deemed as “en-
emies of all mankind” (hostis humani generis).16
After enactments of national laws by many states, the first conclud-
ed international legal instrument pertaining piracy was the Declaration 
of Paris 1856 right after the Crimean War.17 The Declaration’s huge con-
tribution to the fight against piracy was its abolition of privateering. 
Privateers are non-naval vessel owned by private persons, sanctioned 
by governments to actively engage in hostilities against enemies of 
the said government.18 Usually, privateers preyed on commercial ship-
ping of the enemy in order to deny them of war materials and supplies. 
Both France and United Kingdom, the instigators of the Declaration, 
refrained from using privateers during the Crimean War because they 
already had powerful navies and have no need of “outside help” against 
Russian Empire. Moreover, since privateers were in it for the money 
and not for King and Country, they were difficult to control and no 
guarantee of them never to plunge into outright piracy.19
16  “Pirates are common enemies, and they are attacked with impunity by all, because 
they are without the pale of the law. They are scorners of the law of nations; hence 
they find no protection in that law. They ought to be crushed by us [...] and by all men. 
This is a warfare shared by all nations”. See Alberico Gentili, De Jure Belli Libri Tres 
[Three Books on the Law of War], trans. by John C Rolfe (New York: Oceana Publica-
tions, 1964), p. 423.
17  Declaration Respecting Maritime Law. Paris, 16 April 1856. Natalino Ronzitti (ed), 
The Law of Naval Warfare, A Collection of Agreements and Documents with Com-
mentaries, (Amsterdam: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), p. 64.
18  Privateers such as the famous Sir Francis Drake was even made a knight by his 
king, as seen from the prefix Sir before his name, symbolising the state’s acknowl-
edgement over the privateer’s use of force and pillage against enemy nation’s vessels. 
The said acknowledgement was given through issuance of a “Letter of Marque”, a 
formal document issued by one country authorizing one of its private citizen to arm a 
ship and seize vessels of enemy nation.
19  Edward Teach, famously known as Blackbeard, was an example of privateer turned 
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Landmark condemnation of piracy was attained with the adoption 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
1982.20 Definition of piracy in UNCLOS 1982 is as follows:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
a)  any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a pri-
vate ship or a private aircraft, and directed
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against per-
sons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any state;
(b)  any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an 
aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c)  any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in 
subparagraph (a) or (b).
A pirate ship is a private ship that is intended to be used by the per-
son controlling it, to commit acts of piracy.21 Piracy can also be com-
mitted by a warship or other government ship only if the crew has com-
mitted mutiny and taken control of the ship to engage in acts of piracy.22
The above definitions of piracy and pirate ship in UNCLOS 1982 
are a verbatim copy of the provisions on piracy contained within the 
high seas convention 1958.23 In turn, the definition of piracy in the high 
seas convention reflected the drafters’ understanding of the concepts of 
piracy in the previous century. As we will see, this outdated concept has 
many shortcomings to address the problem of contemporary piracy in 
general and piracy in Southeast Asia in particular.
First, UNCLOS 1982 maintained that for a hostile act at sea to be 
construed as piracy, it must be committed only on the high seas or other-
wise at places outside the jurisdiction of any state.24 Criminal acts at sea 
pirate.
20  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (Montego Bay, 10 December 
1982), 1833 UNTS 397, Art. 101.
21  Id., Art. 103.
22  Id., Art. 102.
23  Convention on the High Seas (Geneva, 29 April 1958), 450 UNTS 81, art. 15.
24  UNCLOS 1982, supra note 21, Art. 101(a)(i) and (ii).
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in Southeast Asia occurred rarely on the high seas. Most armed attacks 
occurred within the 12 nautical mile limit of territorial sea, sometimes 
even at ports.25 The Strait of Malacca is a good example, at its entry 
point on the western side, the strait is very spacious with an approxi-
mately 200 Nm distance between the coasts of Malaysia and Indonesia 
but the closer a ship gets into Singapore, the Strait gets more and more 
narrow. At its narrowest part, the strait has a breadth of only 8,4 Nm 
which is completely divided into territorial waters of littoral states.26 
The situation is the same in the Strait of Singapore where the width is 
only 15 Nm and 11 Nm wide at the exit point into the South China Sea.27
The depth factor further complicates matters. Around a point known 
as “the one fathom bank”, big draft ships can only navigate trough an 
area of two NM wide with irregular depths, even as shallow as eleven 
metres.28 Any vessels but the smallest is compelled to navigate with 
extreme caution and minimum speed, an ideal moment for the tiger 
(pirates) to pounce on the prey.
If an attack occurred in these territorial waters as it usually does, 
then such attack is not piracy under international law. Thus, there are 
no advantages of its qualification as piracy jure gentium, e.g. universal 
jurisdiction and right of hot pursuit.
The second and third element of UNCLOS 1982 definition of piracy 
is the “two ships” and “private ends”. Article 101(a) stipulated that an 
act is piracy if it is committed by the crew or passengers of “a private 
ship” against “another ship”. Furthermore, the unlawful attack must 
only be motivated by monetary considerations. These two elements re-
flected the concept of piracy in the 16th century until its eradication in 
the early 19th century. Those days, what is called by “a pirate” was (1) 
a person working on board a ship; (2) the ship was used solely to attack 
other ships; (3) in order to take whatever cargo or valuables carried by 
25  Approximately only 10 – 15 percent of attacks occurred in the Strait of Malacca 
(traffic separation scheme), while the rest occurred within territorial waters of Indo-
nesia, Malaysia and Singapore. See supra note 13.
26  Michael Leifer, Malacca Singapore and Indonesia, 2 vols, ed. By Gerard J. Man-
gone, International Straits of the World (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 
1978), p. 53.
27  Id.
28  Id., p. 59
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the victim ship (or take possession of the victim ship itself to be used 
as another pirate ship); and (4) sold the booty for money, the money 
gained was therefore divided amongst the persons involved in the act.29
Three years after the conclusion of UNCLOS 1982, a fateful event 
brought to light the obsolescence of the above concept of piracy. On 
October 7th, 1985, four men claimed to represent the Palestine Libera-
tion Front, took control of the cruise ship MV Achille Lauro as it sailed 
from Alexandria to Port Said.30 The hijackers, who previously poised 
as passengers, demanded the release of fifty Palestinian in Israeli pris-
ons. It is clear that in situations such as this, UNCLOS 1982 regime 
on piracy could not be applied since: (1) no other ship involved in the 
incident as “pirate ship”;31 and (2) the primary motivation was political 
rather than monetary.32 Another problem is multiple motivations for the 
attack, if the act aimed to get money and the money gained is used in 
furtherance of political goals, it is unclear whether such a case fulfills 
the element “for private ends”.33
Another shortcoming of the UNCLOS 1982 definition is on one 
type of violence at sea informally called “seajacking”, argot for ships 
earning this fate is “phantom ships”. Seajacking is the act of seizure of 
a victim ship; the stolen ship is then repainted, renamed and re-doc-
umented to appear as a different, legitimate ship.34 Furthermore, the 
29  “Piracy, in its original and strict meaning, is every unauthorized act of violence on 
the Open Sea against another vessel with intent to plunder (animo furandi)”. L. Op-
penheim, International Law: A Treatise, I vols, (London: Longmans, 1905), p. 325.; 
See also Ethan C. Stile, ‘Reforming Current International Law to Combat Modern Sea 
Piracy’, Suffolk Transnational Law Review, 27 (2004), 299-326 (304-305). 
30  ‘1985: Gunmen hijack Italian cruise liner’, BBC on this day, available at <http://
news.bbc.co.uk /onthisday/>
31  The four armed highjackers boarded the cruise ship posed as tourists. 
32  It is worth to note that the private ends element had already been contended as early 
as 1844 when the United States Supreme Court held that “Where the act (Act of 1819) 
uses the word ‘piratical,’ it does so in a general sense [...] hostile in its character, wan-
ton and criminal in its commission [...] In short, it means that the act belongs to the 
class of offences which pirates are [...] perpetrating, whether they do it for purposes of 
plunder, or for purposes of hatred, revenge, or wanton abuse of power. United States 
v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210, (1844), par. 15.
33  A possible scenario in Southeast Asia would involve a highjack of a ship and sold 
the booty to fund separatist or terrorist movement.
34  An example of seajacking is the fate of Malaysian oil tanker SUCI which was 
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newly acquired ship is used for regular purposes which are not neces-
sary unlawful, such as carriage of goods by sea. Phantom ships cannot 
be categorized as pirate ship according to article 103 of UNCLOS 1982 
since it is not used to commit piracy against another vessel. Therefore, 
a state’s law enforcement vessel is not empowered to seize a suspected 
phantom ship because it’s not a pirate ship by definition.35 In addition, 
the victim ship seized either within territorial sea or on ports (the same 
problem as the “high seas” element above).
Realizing these deficiencies within UNCLOS 1982, the Internation-
al Maritime Organization (IMO) sponsored the Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 
1988 (SUA 1988).36 The SUA 1988 stipulated that an act is an offence 
under the convention if the perpetrator unlawfully and intentionally 
seizing control of a ship by force or threat of force or intimidation; per-
forms acts of violence against a person on board a ship, causes damage 
to the ship or to its cargo which is likely endanger the safe navigation 
of that ship.37
If we see the definition of offence by the SUA 1988, it is clear that 
the convention eliminates both the two-ships and the private ends ele-
ments. An offence still occurs disregarding the motivations, as long as it 
is done unlawfully and intentionally. SUA 1988 also does not take into 
consideration of where the source of attack came from, be it from other 
boarded by six armed men who tied up the seventeen-man crew, repainted the fun-
nel, and reportedly changed the ship’s name to the GLORY II. See Niclas Dahlvang, 
‘Thieves, Robbers, & Terrorists: Piracy In The 21st Century’, Regent Journal of In-
ternational Law, 4 (2006), 17 (17). Stolen vessels can easily be given new flag and 
identities to appear legitimate. Flags of convenience like Panama and the Bahamas are 
known for not asking too many questions.
35  UNCLOS 1982, supra note 21, Arts. 105 and 102 “taken by piracy and under the 
control of pirates”
36  Malvina Halberstam, ‘Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and 
the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety’, American Journal of International Law, 
83 (1988), 269-310 (270).
37  Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, (Rome, 10 March 1988) 1678 UNTS 222, Art. 3. According to the defini-
tion provided in SUA 1988 Convention, virtually all kind of acts involving the use of 
force that may endanger safe navigation of a ship (e.g. disabling ship communication, 
violence or threat of violence against pilot, disruption of steering, et cetera) is an of-
fence under the convention.
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ships, passengers on board the ship (or stowaways or members of the 
crew), or from land (while berthing). However, SUA 1988 still main-
tains an element similar to the high seas element of the UNCLOS 1982, 
Article 4 SUA 1988 stated that the convention applies if the ship is nav-
igating of is scheduled to navigate into, through or from waters beyond 
the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single State, or the lateral limits 
of its territorial sea with adjacent States. In other words, it covers acts 
of piracy committed either on the EEZ or Contiguous Zones, but it does 
not cover attacks committed within the twelve Nm limits of territorial 
waters (including internal and archipelagic waters).
Despite its importance for the advancement of anti-piracy effort in 
the Strait of Malacca, only Singapore is a party to the SUA 1988. It is 
regrettable that countries most affected by piracy such as Indonesia and 
Malaysia, are not parties to the convention.38
As we can see from the above elaboration, the most problematic 
and unsolved legal barrier for categorizing most unlawful acts at sea 
in Southeast Asia as piracy is locus delicti. In 2001, the IMO adopted 
a Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and 
Armed Robbery against Ships.39 Aware of the locus delicti issue, the 
IMO divided piratical acts into two categories; the first is piracy accord-
ing to UNCLOS 1982 that’s only occurred on the high seas, the second 
is “armed robbery against ships” that occurred within national waters of 
a state. Despite using the word “robbery”, the scope of the definition is 
the same as piracy on the high seas, the code defined the offence as any 
unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat 
thereof, other than an act of piracy, directed against a ship or against 
persons or property on board such a ship, within a State’s jurisdiction 
over such offences.40
The next important legal instrument on piracy and armed robbery 
38  The Philippines and Singapore are parties to the SUA 1988. See IMO Homepage 
[online], Status of Conventions by Country, available at <http://www.imo.org/Con-
ventions/>
39  IMO, ‘Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against Ships’ (29 November 2001), A 22/Res.922. Note that this resolution 
is not binding upon states.
40  Id., Annex., §2.
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against ships is the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Pi-
racy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).41 ReCAAP 
obliges state parties to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery 
against ships; to arrest the suspected perpetrators; to seize pirate ships 
or ships used to commit armed robbery against ships; to seize ships un-
der pirate control and seize property on board such ships; and to rescue 
victims of piracy and armed robbery against ships.42
In definitional matters, the ReCAAP, unlike the SUA 1988 and IMO 
Code, reintroduce the restriction that armed robbery against ships as 
acts committed only for private ends.43 Despite that supposed drawback, 
ReCAAP gave very concrete ways to curb piracy and armed robbery 
against ships by establishing an Information Sharing Centre; impose 
upon state parties the obligation to cooperate on extradition and mutual 
legal assistance; and capacity building.44
41  Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
Ships in Asia, (Tokyo, 11 November 2004), 2398 UNTS 199.
42  Id., Art. 3.
43  Id., Art. 1. The exclusion of the element of motive in the SUA 1988 was a direct 
response to Achille Lauro incident, which was committed for political ends, not pri-
vate monetary purposes. That way, the SUA 1988 was designed to answer terrorist 
acts at sea. On the other hand, the ReCAAP was not designed as a legal framework 
for anti-terrorism due to re-inclusion of private ends motive as an element of offence. 
Also note that ReCAAP’s preamble does not recall any Security Council Resolutions 
on terrorism.
44  See part III for discussion.
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IV. WHAT HAS BEEN DONE TO CURB PIRACY IN SEA AND ITS 
DEFICIENCIES
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member coun-
tries had envisioned the achievement of an ASEAN Community by 
2020,45 ASEAN Community is a dynamic, cohesive, resilient and inte-
grated community based on three pillars: Security, Economy and Socio-
Cultural.46 The Fourteenth ASEAN Summit held in Thailand at March 
2009 had produced an important document in the effort to materialize 
the security pillar of that goal, that document is the ASEAN Political-
Security Community Blueprint.47 The blueprint calls for a more inten-
sive regional strategy and actions to meet all threats to regional security 
and stability, including non-traditional security threats such as transna-
tional crime.48 Piracy and armed robbery against ships often involves 
international crime syndicates. Even in cases that doesn’t involve cross 
border syndicate, culprits of the crime may move across borders, mak-
ing it a transnational problemWithin ASEAN framework, the high-
est body dealing with transnational crime is the ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC). In its second meeting, the 
AMMTC adopted the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational 
Crime (TNC Plan of Action),49 which in turn further elaborated in the 
Work Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat 
Transnational Crime (TNC Work Programme).50 The Plan of Action and 
the Work Programme outlined pillars to curb piracy somewhat similar 
to the ones found in ReCAAP: sharing of information, mutual legal as-
sistance in criminal matters, training and capacity building.
45  ASEAN, ‘ASEAN Vision 2020’, (Kuala Lumpur, 15 December 1997), available at 
<http://www.aseansec .org/>
46  ASEAN, ‘Declaration of ASEAN Concord II’, (Bali, 7 October 2003), available 
at <http://www.aseansec. org/>. Regional economic integration and common welfare 
cannot be reached without political stability and secure environment.
47  ASEAN, ‘ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint’, (Cha-am, Thailand, 1 
March 2009), available at <http://www.aseansec.org/>
48  Id., §B.4.1.
49  ASEAN, ‘ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime’. (Yangon, 23 
June 1999), available at <http://www.aseansec.org/>
50  ASEAN, ‘Work Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat 
Transnational Crime’, (Kuala Lumpur, 17 May 2002), available at <http://www.ase-
ansec.org/>
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I. Information Sharing
Expeditious flow of information and effective coordination between 
stakeholders is necessary in dealing with transnational crimes, especial-
ly the ones that took place at sea. The most logical way to effectively 
achieve that is by establishing a centralised body that has the capacity 
not only to facilitate exchange of information between governments, 
but also to serve as a “hotline” for shipmasters and other users of water-
ways to report any actual or attempted piracy or armed robbery.
The IMB has been giving us an example of the effectiveness such 
body in the form of the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC). The PRC 
is based in Kuala Lumpur where it maintains a 24-hour watch on the 
world’s shipping lanes, receiving reports of piracy and armed robbery 
from ship crews (and the public in general), and forward the reports to 
law enforcement agencies. The centre also issued warnings on piracy 
hotspots for the shipping industry. One point that has to be remembered 
is that while the PRC succeeded in serving the shipping industry, it is 
at a relative disadvantage because it is not formed by any government. 
Law enforcement agencies belonging to some countries in the region 
might be reluctant to cooperate wholeheartedly with such private in-
stitution, more so considering their assumption that it’s controlled by 
– and serve the interests of – western corporations.51
There is another disadvantage aside from institutional as explained 
above. In its reports, the PRC does not differentiate between acts of 
piracy that occurred at the high seas and threats against ships other than 
piracy which occurred within the jurisdiction of a state.52 This may cre-
ate some confusion, for example, criminal acts that took place at the 
entry of the Malacca Strait but closer to Indonesian territorial waters 
than Malaysia might be misinterpreted as occurred within Indonesian 
area of responsibility, despite the possibility that it happened at interna-
tional waters. This may creates reluctance from the part of littoral states 
to fully trust and cooperate with the PRC due to the potential bad image 
51  The PRC receives funding primarily from the business community.
52  The IMB put Piracy AND armed robbery against ships into a single definition: 
“any act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to com-
mit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in 
furtherance of that act.” See ICC – IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, 
Annual Reports (various years).
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may caused by its reports.
The other notable effort in information sharing is the Information 
Sharing Centre (ISC) formed under the framework of ReCAAP. A sig-
nificant distinction of the ISC as compared to the PRC is that the ISC 
was created by governments as a means of international cooperation 
and has a status of an international organisation.53 This way, the ISC 
has greater potential to “be taken seriously” and to achieve effective 
coordination with law enforcement agencies of littoral states, the first 
responders with powers of authority in dealing with criminal acts at sea. 
It status also speaks of stable funding from contracting parties and sup-
port from IMO and other international organisations.54
The main client of the ISC is governments. They serve to receive 
and manage information relating to incidents of piracy and armed rob-
bery among contracting parties,55 and if there is a reasonable grounds 
to believe that threat of piracy and armed robbery is imminent, the ISC 
is to provide an appropriate alert to the contracting parties.56 Each con-
tracting parties is to designate a focal point responsible for its com-
munication with the ISC and with each other’s focal points,57 there is 
no mechanism for communication trough channels other than the focal 
points. ReCAAP does not provide a way for masters to communicate 
directly with the ISC, there is no other alternatives for them other than 
contacting authorities of coastal states.
If there is a threat of piracy or armed robbery to a ship, a master 
should first inform the nearest coastal state response center, the coastal 
state then pass the information to the designated focal point in their 
country, the focal point then would send report to the ISC and ask for 
assistance to detect, arrest perpetrators and rescue the victim ship, in 
turn the ISC would alert focal points of other contracting parties of the 
incident.58 This arrangement might be problematic in some cases, par-
ticularly if it happened in a tight, busy and cross territorial traffic such 
53  ReCAAP, supra note 42, Arts. 4 and 5.
54  Id., Art. 6.
55  Id., Arts. 7(a) and (b).
56  Id., Art. 7(d).
57  Id., Art. 9. 
58  ReCAAP Homepage [online], ISC Information flow and Response Chart. Available 
at http://www.recaap.org/
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as the Strait of Malacca. Shipmasters may be reluctant to report to the 
national authorities because of the time it takes to go trough national 
criminal law procedure such as procès-verbal,59 this is undesirable re-
membering their tight schedule of cargo delivery.60 Other than that, ves-
sels are expected to report to the nearest coastal state law enforcement 
base. In the case of Malacca Strait, that means ships should know in-
dividual bases – and “phone numbers” of – the police forces and naval 
forces of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, no single 911 
number. Furthermore, ships crossing the Strait must maintain a regu-
lated speed at a regulated path, making it difficult to buy some time for 
the procedure to kick in.
As a regional organisation with membership of all Southeast Asian 
nations, ASEAN could use its advantages and take the initiative to form 
a coordinative information sharing body, combining the positive points 
of the PRC and ISC. That has not yet happened, however. In section 
concerning sea piracy, the TNC Work Programme outlined actions that 
will be taken by ASEAN in a very limited scope.61
Another existing form of cooperation in the field of information 
sharing that can be used as a model for future cooperation is the tri-
lateral information exchange agreement between Indonesia, Malaysia 
and the Philippines.62 The agreement aimed to promote cooperation and 
introduce an information and intelligence exchange system alongwith 
communication procedures among the three countries. All three coun-
59  In Indonesia, for example, the law requires procès-verbal to be conducted in front 
of a designated police or other law enforcement investigator, a time consuming proce-
dure. Chief of Police Decision No. Pol.Skep/1205/IX/2000.
60  This is the reason why shipmasters prefer to report incidents to the IMB.
61  1. Member countries to submit all national laws and regulations and international 
agreements and conventions applicable on piracy and armed robbery at sea to the 
ASEAN Secretariat;
2. Member Countries to submit directory of Focal Points to the ASEAN Secretariat;
3. ASEAN Secretariat to write to INTERPOL as well as other think-tanks in the re-
gion to undertake national studies to determine trends and “modus operandi” of piracy 
in South-east Asian waters.
62  Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Pro-
cedures, (Malaysia – Philippines – Indonesia), (Putrajaya, Malaysia, 7 May 2002). 
(MAPHILINDO ICA)
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tries shared porous sea boundaries with one another,63 a situation rather 
similar to the Strait of Malacca. Moreover, the surrounding areas such 
as the Sulu archipelago, Mindanao and Sulawesi has been plagued with 
separatism and sectarian conflicts, a trigger of transnational crimes like 
arms smuggling and armed robbery against ships. The MAPHILINDO 
ICA explicitly spelled out on what areas the parties will cooperate, in-
cluding hijacking, sea piracy and armed robbery.64 A positive point of 
the MAPHILINDO ICA is that it solved matter of jurisdiction by simple 
agreement; it stated that a person arrested for an offense shall be dealt 
with in accordance with the laws of the arresting Party, provided that 
notification is given to the country of nationality.65
From the above elaboration we could see that regional effort in 
combating piracy and armed robbery will be benefited even more from 
a centralised reporting authority that is: (1) formed by governments 
and has the status of an international organisation, or created within the 
structure of existing and regionally well known international organisa-
tion such as ASEAN; (2) acts as a liaison, facilitate flow of information 
and coordinate cooperation not only between governments and govern-
ment agencies, but also involving actors in the business sector and other 
user of waterways; and (3) maintains a reporting system which catego-
rised criminal incidents according to its locus delicti.
2. Cooperation In Legal Matters
Cooperation in criminal justice, especially about law enforcement, 
jurisdiction and extradition, is indispensable to be able to successfully 
handle the problem of sea piracy and armed robbery against ships. The 
TNC Plan of Action put in place a comprehensive cooperation in legal 
matters and law enforcement. On legal matters, it encouraged ASEAN 
member states to, among others:66
1.  Work for the criminalization in ASEAN Member Countries of spe-
63  Sulu and Sulawesi seas.
64  MAPHILINDO ICA, supra note 63. Art. 3. Other areas including on terrorism, 
money laundering, smuggling of goods and persons, illegal entry, drug trafficking, 
theft of marine resources, marine pollution and arms trafficking. 
65  Id., Arts. 5(4) & (5).
66  TNC Plan of Action, supra note 50.
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cific transnational crimes, such as illicit drug trafficking, money 
laundering, terrorism, piracy, arms smuggling and trafficking in per-
sons
2.  Develop multilateral or bilateral legal arrangements to facilitate ap-
prehension, investigation, prosecution, and extradition, exchange of 
witnesses, sharing of evidence, inquiry, seizure and forfeiture of the 
proceeds of the crime in order to enhance mutual legal and adminis-
trative assistance among ASEAN Member Countries
3.  Study the possibility of creating a regional programme on witness 
protection
4.  Coordinate with the ASEAN Senior Law Officials Meeting on the 
implementation of the ASEAN Legal Information Network System. 
On law enforcement, it encouraged member states to:67
1. Develop programmes for joint tactical exercises and simulations
2.  Develop an exchange programme among ASEAN officials in the 
policy, legal, law enforcement and academic fields
3. Enhance cooperation and coordination in law enforcement, intel-
ligence sharing
In relation to the above, the most notable achievement by ASEAN 
countries is the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters, concluded at Kuala Lumpur in 29 November 2004 (ASEAN MLA 
Treaty).68 The ASEAN MLA Treaty has the ultimate purpose to enhance 
cooperation between contracting parties in the field of prevention, in-
vestigation and prosecution of criminal acts, including on court pro-
ceedings. An example of provisions of the ASEAN MLA Treaty that 
could deter transnational crimes is that the parties shall assist each 
other in tracing property derived from the commission of an offence, 
restraining or freezing dealings of such property, and confiscation and 
subsequent recovery of the property to its rightful owner.69 This would 
negate profits for transnational criminal syndicates. With membership 
of almost all Southeast Asian countries,70 the ASEAN MLA Treaty has 
67  Id.
68  Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, (Kuala Lumpur, 29 No-
vember 2004), 2336 UNTS 271.
69  Id., Arts. 2(1)(h) and (i).
70  From ten Southeast Asian states, only Myanmar and Thailand are not party to the 
ASEAN MLA Treaty.
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a great potential to serve as a legal framework – and basis for future de-
sign – for regional cooperation in combating piracy and armed robbery 
against ships. However, the treaty still left a few things to be desired.
ASEAN MLA Treaty explicitly excludes the matter of extradition 
from its scope of application,71 despite the similarity of some of its con-
tents provisions with extradition treaties.72 This implies that contracting 
parties still prefer extradition to be regulated under separate extradition 
treaties between them. On the subject of extradition, one important in-
strument to be remembered is the SUA 1988 convention.
Article 11 of the SUA 1988 Convention (2005 Protocol to the SUA 
Convention) ease the extradition of perpetrators of offences between 
parties to the convention by two ways. First, state parties are obliged 
to include offences under the convention as an extraditable offence in 
extradition treaties between them (both existing and future treaties).73 
Second, it opens the possibility for the convention to serve as a legal 
basis for extradition in the absence of extradition treaty between the 
parties.74 Unfortunately, regional effort in combating piracy and armed 
robbery against ships cannot enjoy the benefits of the 2005 Protocol to 
the SUA 1988 Convention since none of ASEAN countries have ac-
ceded to the 2005 Protocol to the SUA 1988 Convention.75 For these 
reasons, it is recommended that future regional extradition agreement 
be agreed upon by all ASEAN states, incorporating piracy and armed 
robbery against ships as an extraditable offence, thus eliminating the 
need to form bilateral treaties between states.
Further, the ASEAN MLA Treaty allows a requested party to re-
fuse to give assistance to the requesting party if the act in question had 
occurred in the territory of the requested party and where it is not an 
offence against the law of the requested party.76 This limitation is un-
derstandable due to the general nature of the convention; it covers as-
71  ASEAN MLA Treaty, supra note 69, Arts. 2(1)(a) and (c).
72  See United Nations General Assembly, ‘Model Treaty on Extradition’, UNGA Res 
45/116, (1990).
73  SUA 1988 Convention, supra note 38, Art. 11(1).
74  Id., Art. 11(2).
75  IMO Homepage [online], Status of conventions by country, available at <http://
www.imo.org/ Conventions/>
76  ASEAN MLA Treaty, supra note 69, Art. 3(1)(e).
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sistance in all steps of criminal justice system, irrespective of the types 
of offences. In the future, however, it is recommended that the ASEAN 
MLA Treaty be amended to include a list of definitions of specific trans-
national crimes and attach a stronger obligation to cooperate on inves-
tigations, prosecutions and proceedings of those crimes. Furthermore, 
future agreement(s) should also impose an obligation for state parties 
to enact laws categorising any acts of piracy and armed robbery against 
ships as a criminal offence under their national laws, without regard 
to the actual location of the commission (covering the entire bodies of 
water of all contracting parties). National legislations should also have 
similar definition of offence and comparable penalties.
III.COOPERATION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT
In matters of law enforcement, an area in need of concerted effort is 
the right of hot pursuit or similar right thereof. Under international law, 
the right of hot pursuit allows a warship or a military aircraft of coastal 
state to pursuit foreign vessel which has violated that state’s law within 
its territorial waters and to arrest it on the high seas.77 In case of piracy, 
warships of a state have the right to pursuit and seize pirate ship only if 
it is found on the high seas or any other place outside the jurisdiction of 
a state.78 Both of these rights end when the pirate / criminal ship enters 
the territorial waters of another state.79 This legal limitation to the right 
to pursuit pirates and marine criminals is unsuitable for Southeast Asia 
where countries’ maritime delimitations are closely packed to one an-
other. Criminals from country A could commit armed robbery in territo-
rial waters of country B and ran away to hide in the territorial waters of 
country C; the authorities of country B or A could only chase the crimi-
nals up to the limits of their own territorial waters. Regional coopera-
tion is crucial to deal with situation in Southeast Asia. An ideal kind of 
cooperation must not only include informing one another of suspected 
pirate vessels, but also one that enables law enforcement ships of one 
country to chase suspected pirates / armed robbers into the territorial 
77  UNCLOS 1982, supra note 21, Art. 111; High Seas Convention, supra note 24, 
Art. 23.
78  UNCLOS 1982, Id., Art. 105.
79  Id., Art. 111(3).
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waters of another country.
Fortunately, countries in the region have realised that kind of co-
operation. For the Strait area, Indonesia and Singapore have been con-
ducting a joint coordinated patrol in the Strait of Singapore and the 
Phillip Channel. These patrols were initiated in 1992 and have been 
very successful never since, proven by the fact that the area of opera-
tions already free of robberies in the first two years.80 Indonesia also has 
a similar bilateral coordinated patrol agreement with Malaysia, named 
Optima Malindo. The Indo – Malay patrol is conducted three times a 
year with 20-days duration per period of operation involving all mari-
time institutions of both countries. After witnessing continuous success 
over the course of several years, the three riparian states to the Strait of 
Malacca have agreed on a trilateral agreement on coordinated patrols in 
2004,81 since the joint patrols began to be carried out, the crime rate in 
the 500-mile long strait has decreased by about 70 percent.82
Perhaps the most striking feature of the MALSINDO Corpat is the 
limited right of hot pursuit contained therein. A warship from one coun-
try will be allowed to enter the territorial waters of another country 
when chasing a pirate ship, provided that this is communicated first 
to the host country.83 Due to the national security sensitivities of the 
issue, open source data on the field results of this limited right of hot 
pursuit is nonexistent. However, in order to avoid needless disputes and 
to smoothening cross-territorial pursuit, it is recommended that future 
patrol agreements also includes arrangement on exchange of shipriders 
among the three countries.
Shiprider agreements involve a hosting of law enforcement per-
sonnel from a coastal state on board a warship of another state; the 
80  ‘Singapore Ministry of Defence, Singapore and Indonesia Participate in Indo-Sin 
Coordinated Patrols (ISCP) and Joint Socio-Civic Activities’, Ministry of Defence, 
Singapore, 9 October 2001, news release, available at  <http://www.mindef.gov.sg/> 
81  ‘Launch of Trilateral Coordinated Patrols - MALSINDO Malacca Straits Coordi-
nated Patrol’, Ministry of Defence, Singapore, 20 July 2004, News release, available 
at <http://www.mindef.gov.sg/>
82  ‘Indonesian, Malaysian Customs Conduct Coordinated Patrols in Malacca Strait’, 
Kompas, 31 July 2009, available at <http://english.kompas.com/> 
83  ‘Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore Launch Coordinated Patrol of Malacca Strait’, 
The Jakarta Post, 20 July 2004. <available at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/>
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hosted law enforcement personnel – called a shiprider – will have the 
authority to give permission to chase pirates from its own territorial 
waters into the territorial seas of the coastal state.84 The practice of us-
ing shipriders is often found in the drug war where the United States 
have concluded more than twenty bilateral agreements with countries 
in the Caribbean.85 In the context of piracy, the United Nations Secu-
rity Council acknowledged the merits of shiprider agreements when it 
adopted Resolution 1851 (2008) in response to the recent resurgence 
of piracy off the coast of Somalia.86 This resolution sheds light on re-
cent developments of international law on piracy, despite the fact that 
the Security Council insistently stated that the Resolution apply only 
with respect to the situation in Somalia and shall not be considered as 
establishing customary international law. Furthermore, aside for per-
mitting cross-border pursuit, shipriders will also play a role in support 
of criminal investigation and prosecution. Navy seadogs generally are 
not trained in law enforcement, even if some of them do, they cannot 
be expected to gather evidence and assume that it would be admissible 
and sufficient in foreign countries. It is the shiprider that will carry out 
arrests, seizure, interrogation, gathering of evidence and other crime 
scene investigations in accordance with their national law.87 Incorporat-
ing shiprider regime into future MALSINDO Corpats would not only 
push forward anti piracy efforts in the strait, but it would also serve as a 
precedent for anti-piracy efforts in other parts of the world.
If trilateral cooperation in the Malacca area is improving, the same 
cannot be said about conditions in the convergence of three maritime 
borders of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, also known as the 
tri-border sea area. The only form of patrol cooperation is bilateral, and 
even that is very limited.88 The inexistence of trilateral coordinated joint 
84  Michael Byers, ‘Policing the High Seas: the Proliferation Security Initiative’, 
American Journal of International Law, 98 (2004), 526-545 (539)
85  Id., p. 538. 
86  See United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1851 (2008). UNSC/Res/1851 
(2008).
87  For example, see ‘Agreement Between the Government of Barbados and the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America Concerning Co-Operation in Suppressing 
Illicit Maritime Drug Trafficking’, (United States – Barbados), (25 Juni 1997), Digest 
of United States Practice in International Law. available at <http://www.state.gov>
88  “Corpat Philindo” between Indonesia and the Philippines is conducted four times a 
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patrol between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines is regrettable 
since these same countries have concluded the MAPHILINDO ICA 
that can be used to support the patrols.
IV.EXTRA REGIONAL PARTICIPATION
It is an unfortunate fact that not all countries in Southeast Asia have 
the necessary financial resources to deal with marine security in general 
and piracy and armed robbery in particular. Indonesia and the Philip-
pines, the only two archipelagic states in the region with the largest 
waters, are still in a relatively bad shape as a result of the financial crisis 
in the late 90s. Without a doubt, cooperation of countries from outside 
the region is vital to maintain and improve anti-piracy efforts. However, 
that cooperation should never take form of the presence of force. Any 
gung-ho attitude of unilaterally planning to send armed patrols89 will be 
met with certain opposition90 and sometimes with equally hawkish at-
titude.91 Aid from wealthy countries should only be limited in forms of 
equipment and training, such as the recent donation of three patrol boats 
from Japan for the Indonesian maritime police.92
year, but each patrol involves only one vessel from each country and lasts for only 10 
days, while the “Ops Phimal” between the Philippines and Malaysia consists of only 
two patrols annually. See Ian Storey, “‘Triborder sea’ is SE Asian danger zone”, Asia 
Times Online, 18 October 2007. available at  <http://www.atimes.com/>.  
89  Admiral Thomas Fargo, the commander of American forces in the Pacific, told a 
Congressional committee that the Navy was considering armed patrols in the Strait of 
Malacca, without first consulting with littoral states. This speech caused a diplomatic 
tension between US and Malaysia. See ‘Piracy and Terrorism’, The New York Times, 
10 April 2004. available at <http://www.nytimes.com/>.
90  Indonesia and Malaysia had rejected out of hand a Singapore proposal for a fourth 
country -- meaning the United States -- to take part in patrolling the strait. See The 
Jakarta Post, supra note 85.
91  See for example ‘To Secure the Malacca Strait, Indonesia Still Hasn’t Signed Re-
CAAP’, Antara, 1 September 2006, (In Indonesian). available at <http://www.antara.
co.id/print/ 1157122267> 
92  See for examples: Japan’s ten million dollar aid for maritime surveillance system 
for the Indonesian Navy: M. Rizal Maslan, ‘Jepang Bantu Sistem Penginderaan di 
Indonesia’, Detik News, 6 October 2009, (in Indonesian), available at <http://www.
detiknews.com/>; Japan’s aid of three maritime patrol boats for Indonesian National 
Police: Indra Subagja, ‘Rajawali Jepang Jaga Malaka’, Detik News, 30 November 
2007, (in Indonesian), available at <http://www.detiknews.com/>; see also United 
83 Volume 12 Number 1 October 2014
Jurnal Hukum Internasional
V. CONCLUSION
It is a matter of course that the most sure-fire way to curb piracy, 
and indeed all crimes, is to eliminate poverty and guarantee the avail-
ability of decent source of living. Having said that, one cannot help but 
wonder how long it will take before littoral seas in ASEAN is free from 
piracy and armed robbery against ships, most ASEAN countries are still 
struggling economically and hence, each are focusing their time and 
resources to combat poverty and domestic problems.
Other than long-term solution to the underlying causes of crimes, 
fortunately there are things that could be done by ASEAN states to com-
bat piracy in its waters as has been elaborated in Part II and III above. 
There is an urgent need for ASEAN to step up cooperation among its 
member countries and with the international community in combat-
ing piracy and armed robbery against ships. Concerning definition and 
scope of crimes, ASEAN states would be benefited from a new region-
al convention specifically tailored for the ASEAN situation, it should 
treat armed robbery against ships as a transnational crime and subject 
to international jurisdiction for the treaty’s member states, however, it 
should also incorporate the “ASEAN Way” and ensure that “nobody 
gets offended”, by mandating a close cooperation not just in informa-
tion sharing and command-level cooperation, but also cooperation in 
day-to-day patrol, particularly attachment of shipriders trained in law 
enforcement.
.
States’ aid of fifteen maritime patrol boats for the Indonesian National Police: ‘AS 
Hibahkan 15 Kapal Ke Polri’, NCB-Interpol Indonesia, 15 September 2008, available 
at <http://www.interpol.go.id/> (in Indonesian).
